Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Deseret Generation and Transmission CoOperative, a Utah corporation v. Ferron Elder, et al.
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John P. Ashton; Natasha Matkin; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Attorneys for Appellants.
Michael R. Labrum; Labrum & Taylor; Attorneys for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Deseret v. Elder, No. 860134.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/960

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
'
BRIEF

IB THE SUPREME C O M OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DESERET GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION CO-OPERATIVE, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

No.

20764

Ue/j/

v.

M

FERRON ELDER, et al.,
Defendants.
FERRON ELDER, CLARK JENKINS,
RICHARD McCARVER, THOMAS C.
MABEY and J. McRAY JOHNSON,
Crossclaimants/Appellants.
v.
(District Court No. 7732)
ARVIN BELLON, MAURINE G.
BELLON, E. CURTIS DASTRUP,
LOUIS B. DASTRUP, A. LABRUM
& SONS, INC.,
Crossclairaants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

FILED
OCT

7 1985

APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND £$£. Supieme Court, Utah
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, PRESIDING

LABRUM 8. TAYLOR
Michael R. Labrum
108 North Main
Richfield, Utah
84721
Attorneys for Respondents
BelIon, Dastrup and Labrum

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
John P. Ashton
Natasha Matkin
424 East Fifth South
Third Floor MONY Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)521-3760
Attorneys for Appellants
Elder, Jenkins, McCarver,
Johnson and Mabey

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DESERET GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION CO-OPERATIVE, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

No.

20764

v.
FERRON ELDER, et al.,
Defendants,
FERRON ELDER, CLARK JENKINS,
RICHARD McCARVER, THOMAS C.
MABEY and J. McRAY JOHNSON,
Crossclaimants/Appellants.
v.
(District Court No. 7732)
ARVIN BELLON, MAURINE G.
BELLON, E. CURTIS DASTRUP,
LOUIS B. DASTRUP, A. LABRUM
& SONS, INC.,
Crossclaimants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, PRESIDING

LABRUM & TAYLOR
Michael R. Labrum
108 North Main
Richfield, Utah
84721
Attorneys for Respondents
BelIon, Dastrup and Labrum

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
John P. Ashton
Natasha Matkin
424 East Fifth South
Third Floor MONY Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)521-3760
Attorneys for Appellants
Elder, Jenkins, McCarver,
Johnson and Mabey

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
I.
II.

III.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Proceedings

B.

Statement of the facts

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT
THE LABRUM GROUP SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE
WAS BEFORE THE COURT A MATERIAL ISSUE OF
FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

V. CONCLUSION
VI. ADDENDUM

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
RULES
PAGE
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

5

CASES
Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, (Utah 1983)

5

Christensen v. Abbott, 595 P. 2d 900 (Utah 1979)

7

Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984).

5,6

LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 26 Utah 2d 158,
486 P.2d 1040 (1971)

8

Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976)

5

Treloqqan v. Treloqqan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985)

5

Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. Hirschel Gold Min. Co.,
103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094 (1943)
Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975)

-iii-

7,8
8

I.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW
Did
summary

the District

judgment

for

Court

specific

err

in granting

performance

of

a motion for

a

real

estate

contract when the only evidence submitted revealed an accord and
satisfaction of that contract?
II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Proceedings.

The decision from which

this appeal is taken arose in the course of a condemnation action
filed by Deseret Generation and Transmission Cooperative, a Utah
corporation
Duchesne

(MDeseretM).

County

being

The condemnation
purchased

by

affected property in

appellants

Clark

Jenkins,

Ferron Elder, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey, and J. McRay
Johnson

(the

"Jenkins

group")

from

respondents

Arvin

Bellon,

Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup, Louis B. Dastrup and A.
Labrum & Sons,

Inc.

(the "Labrum group").

In response to the

condemnation action, the Jenkins group had crossclaimed

against

the Labrum group in December, 1982, seeking rescission of the real
estate contract and the Labrum group had filed a counter crossclaim seeking specific performance of that contract.
of

1984, the

crossclaims.

Labrum

group

moved

for

summary

In November

judgment

on

the

The Jenkins group objected to Respondents' Motion

for Summary Judgment, asserting that an accord and satisfaction of

-1-

:he real estate contract had taken place in March of 1983.

In

support of that Objection, the Jenkins group filed an Affidavit by
Ir. George Diumenti, appellants' former
agreement.

On March

counsel, detailing this

19, 1985, Judge Davidson issued a written

ruling finding for the Labrum group in which he specifically considered and rejected the Jenkins group accord and satisfaction
argument.

An Order granting Labrum*s Motion for Summary Judgment

was signed May 22, 1985.
B.

Statement

of

Jenkins group entered

Facts.

On

December

31,

1980,

the

into a Real Estate Contract to purchase

certain real property located in Duchesne County from the Labrum
group for the purpose of developing a residential community.

In

September of 1982, Deseret filed an action condemning a 172.4 foot
strip through the middle of the property to construct high tension
electrical

transmission

(hereinafter

M

towers

R . " ) , pp. 1-5.

and

lines.

Complaint,

On December 10, 1982, the Jenkins

group answered Deseret's Complaint and crossclaimed
Labrum

group

contract.

for

rescission

of

the December

contract
Answer

between

to

the

Crossclaim

parties
and

of

estate

On January 21,

a counter crossclaim

Jenkins group seeking specific performance

against the

1980 real

Answer and Crossclaim, R. , pp. 167-177.

1983, the Labrum group filed

Record

the

against the
real

estate

according to its original terms.

Counterclaim,

R.

pp.

188-206.

Both

groups recognized that the condemnation significantly impaired the
planned development and that monies would be available from the
condemnation.

Representatives
(Appellants

Thomas

C.

from

both

Mabey,

Clark

groups

and

their

attorneys

Jenkins, Richard

McCarver,

Ferron Elder, and their counsel, George Diumenti, and Respondents
Curtis B. Dastrup, Arvin Bellon plus Kay Labrum, Arvin Labrum and
their counsel, Michael R. Labrum)

met March 4, 1983 and agreed to

a recision of the original Real Estate Contract and to disburse
condemnation funds, 75% to the Labrum group and 25% to the Jenkins
group.

Affidavit of George Diumenti, R. , pp. 449-451, a copy of

which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "A".
3.

See 1f1f 2 and

It was also agreed that the Labrum group would retain the

money already paid on the contract as well as improvements made on
the property

and that the two groups would jointly market the

property and resist the condemnation action.
By this date, Deseret had already deposited $39,075 in
condemnation proceeds with the Court, pursuant to § 78-34-9, Utah
Code Annotated.
satisfaction

An integral part of the March 4, 1983 accord and

agreement provided

that

$30,000

of

the monies

on

deposit with the Court would be immediately released to the Labrum
group.
executed

This was done via a Stipulation dated March 11, 1983 and
by

counsel

for

both

groups.

Stipulation,

R. , pp.

275-278, a copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit
M

B" .
On November 1, 1984, after disbursal of three-quarters of

the

condemnation

funds

to

the

-3-

Labrum

group

pursuant

to

the

above-described accord and satisfaction, the Labrum group moved
for summary judgment on the Jenkins1 crossclaim and their counter
crossclaim
estate

seeking

contract.

specific

performance

Defendant's

Motion

of

for

the

original

Summary

Crossclaim and Counter-Crossclaim, R. , p. 379.

Judgment

real
on

In opposition to

this motion, the Jenkins submitted to the Court (February 6, 1985)
the affidavit of their prior counsel, George Diumenti, setting out
the

existence

Exhibit "A".

and terms of the March 4, 1983 agreement.

The Labrum group submitted no evidence contradicting

the alleged accord and satisfaction.
rejected

the

See

defense

and

granted

Judge Davidson specifically

Labrum1s

motion

for

summary

respondents

Summary

judgment on the contract.
III.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Lower Court erred
Judgment

for

specific

in granting

performance

of the real

because the evidence before that Court

estate contract

showed the real

estate

contract had been the subject of the described accord and satisfaction agreement.

Although this subsequent

agreement

was

not

formalized by a written instrument, it was legally binding and the
parties acted in reliance on it.

To allow the Labrum group now to

ignore this agreement would be grossly unfair to the Jenkins group
and without legal foundation.

IV.
ARGUMENT
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT THE LABRUM
GROUP SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE WAS BEFORE THE COURT A MATERIAL
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and a
solid body of case law provide that summary judgment is proper
only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d

100

(Utah 1983).

As the party

moved against would be defeated without the opportunity of trial/
a court is obligated to scrutinize the pleadings, affidavits and
other material before it in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment.

If there is any doubt or uncertainty

concerning questions of fact, the doubt must be resolved in favor
of the opposing party.
P.2d 387 (Utah 1984).
In

the

Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676

Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976).

instant

case, the Jenkins group submitted the

affidavit of George Diumenti opposing summary judgment setting out
in detail the terms of the Accord and Satisfaction between the
parties.

Mr. Diumenti*s Affidavit was made on personal knowledge,

setting forth fact admissible into evidence and about which he was
competent to testify.
of fact.

Such an affidavit provokes a genuine issue

Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985).

-5-

The

Labrum group submitted no affidavits in support of their motion
for summary judgment or in contradiction to Diumenti's affidavit.
On its face, the Diumenti affidavit raises as material issue of
fact the existence of accord and satisfaction between the parties.
Diumenti states in his Affidavit that he believed that
the accord and satisfaction

M

was totally consummated and binding

upon all parties." Exhibit "A" 1f5.

Diumenti

indicates

and the

Record supports the fact that the Stipulation for release of the
$30,000 of the funds deposited with the Court was to be executed
as a part of the accord and satisfaction agreement.

That Stipula-

tion was in fact executed after, and only after, the Agreement.
R., pp. 275-278.

This Stipulation providing for the release of

the funds is attached hereto as Exhibit

M

BM.

From the Record it

is obvious that at a minimum, Diumenti's Affidavit raised as a
material issue of fact the existence of an enforceable accord and
satisfaction agreement.

Therefore, summary judgment was inappro-

priate as a matter of law.
In

his

March

Frisbee, 387, 390.

19, 1985

ruling,

Judge

Davidson

curtly

dismissed the Jenkins group claim of accord and satisfaction as
follows:
This defense, however, seems to be
based upon negotiations for settlement
which were never formally agreed upon.
Accord and satisfaction cannot be based
upon such a foundation.

-6-

Exhibit "C", p. 3.

This statement suggests that Judge Davidson

believed that the accord and satisfaction agreement between the
parties needed to be evidenced by a written instrument to be
binding.

This is not true.

This court has written:

There is no requirement that an accord and
satisfaction must be in writing. The party
alleging accord and satisfaction as an
affirmative defense has the burden of proving its occurrence. We have defined accord
and satisfaction as 'a method of discharging
a contract/ or settling a claim arising from
a contract, by substituting for such contract or claim an agreement for satisfaction
thereof, and the execution of the substituted agreement.•

Christensen v. Abbott, 595 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1979) (Footnotes
omitted).
This Court has, in the past, upheld oral agreements
modifying contracts that affect real property.

In Utah Mercur

Gold Min. Co. v. Hirschel Gold Min. Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d
1094 (1943), a case involving an alleged oral agreement for the
five year extension of a written mining lease, the plaintiffs
argued that they had done exploration and development work over
and above that required in the written contract in reliance on
the oral agreement.

This Court held that the plaintiffs1 alle-

gations of part performance were sufficient to avoid demurrer
on

the

defined

statute
as

of

frauds.

Adequate

part

performance

any act which places the party performing

-7-

was
in a

position that non-performance by the other party would constitute fraud.

Id. at 1096.

The lower court in Utah Mercur based

demurrer on the ground that the pleading of the plaintiff did
not state sufficient facts.

The Supreme Court, however, found

adequate plaintiff's allegations that it had completed

extra

work beyond that necessary to comply with the written, expired
Lease.
In the instant case, the Jenkins group would not have
agreed to release $30,000 to the Labrums unless the parties had
worked out a satisfactory plan dealing with the existing real
estate contract, the future condemnation proceedings

and the

property.

Mercur,

As

demurrer
is

was

inappropriate
in

the

Utah

summary

judgment

matter.

See also LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 26

Utah 2d 158, 486 P.2d

inappropriate

in

Labrurn-Jenkins

1040 (1971) and Woolsey v. Brown, 539

P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975).
V.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment was inappropriate as a matter of law
as the Jenkins group raised below the existence of an enforceable accord

and

satisfaction

agreement between

the parties.

The holding of the lower court must be reversed and the matter
remanded for proper consideration of the accord and satisfaction agreement.

Respectfully submitted this

tbr

day of October, 1985.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Natasha Matkin
Attorneys for Appellants Jenkins,
Elder, McCarver, Mabey & Johnson

1952n
10785

-9-

VI.

ADDENDUM

Exhibit "A

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
John P. Ashton (0134)
Natasha Matkin (4373)
Attorneys for Defendants
Third Floor MONY Plaza
424 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-3760
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DESERET GENERATION &
TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE,
a Utah corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF
GEORGE DIUMENTI II

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 7732
FERRON ELDER, et al.,
Defendants

COME

NOW

Defendants

Ferron

Elder,

Clark

Jenkins,

Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson, by and
through their undersigned counsel, and offer the Affidavit of
George Diumenti II, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" in support
of their objection to Defendants Arvin L. Bellon, A. Labrum &
Sons, Inc., Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup, and Lanis B.
Dastrup's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

on

Crossclaim

and

Counter-Crossclaim and as promised in Defendant's Response to
Cross-Defendant's

Memorandum

in

Support

of

Cross-Defendantfs

Motion for Summary Judgment.
Respectfully

submitted

this

Q *'

day

of

February,

1985.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
i

By

Huio4^\j^'Obl^'
Ia JJL fe

!

Natasha Matkin
Attorneys for Defendants Elder,
Jenkins,
McCarver,
Mabey
and
Johnson

MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this

I r^

day of February, 1985, I hereby certify

that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of George Diumenti II to the
following:
Robert F. Orton
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Michael R. Labrum
LABRUM & TAYLOR
108 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701

ser e t
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AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

) ss.

Comes now George S. Diumenti I I ,

and b e i n g f i r s t duly sworn

upon h i s o a t h , deposes and s a y s as f o l l o w s :

1. Affiant i s an a t t o r n e y ,

l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e law in t h e

S t a t e of Utah and was a c t i n g as counsel on behalf of defendants
Clark J e n k i n s , R i c h a r d M c C a r v e r ,

Thomas C. Mabey, J .

McRay

Johnson, and F e r r i n Elder d u r i n g t h e months of March and April
1983.
2. A f f i a n t ,

attendant

services

to

the

aformentioned

i n d i v i d u a l s d i d , on t h e 4th day of May, 1983, a t approximately
11:00 a.m.

at A f f i a n t ' s

office

located

a t 505 S o u t h Main,

Bountiful, Utah, meet with Thomas C. Mabey, Clark Jenkins, Richard
McCarver, F e r r i n Elder, Kay Labrum, Arvin Labrum, C u r t i s Dastrup,
Arvin Bellon and Michael R. Labrum, E s q . , r e p r e s e n t i n g B e l l o n ,
Labrums and D a s t r u p . The meeting was h e l d by mutual agreement
among t h e p a r t i e s to resolve the various i s s u e s a r i s i n g out of: a
complaint f i l e d in the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court in and for
Duschesne County, S t a t e of Utah, C i v i l #7732; a Motion for Order
of Immediate Occupancy and for Order to Show Cause; an Answer and
C r o s s c l a i m ; an Answer to Crossclaim and Counterclaim; a l l a r i s i n g
out of t h e e f f o r t s

of D e s e r e t

Generation

and

Transmission

Cooperative, a Utah corporation, to adjudicate t h e i r r i g h t to have
a r i g h t - o f - w a y condemned involving c e r t a i n r e a l property in which

the persons present at the March 4, 1983 meeting, and o t h e r s have
an i n t e r e s t .
3. The meeting of March 4, 1983, r e s u l t e d in a consumated
agreement r e s o l v i n g a l l i s s u e s r a i s e d a t t e n d a n t

defendants

Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey, and Johnsons' Crossclaim and defendants
Bellon, Labrums and Dastrup's Counterclaim, which issues arose out
of a previous contractual relationship between the defendants and
o t h e r s . The substance of the agreement was: t h a t of the sum of
$39,075 deposited with the Court by the p l a i n t i f f ,

pursuant to

Section 78-34-9 U.C.A., was to be distributed 75#, e.g. $30,000,
to Bellon, Labrums and Dastrup, and 25$, e.g. $9,000 to Elder,
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and Johnson; the December 31, 1980 real
estate sales c o n t r a c t entered into between Bellon, Dastrup and
Labrums as s e l l e r s and Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and Johnson as
purchasers, was to be rescinded, a l l performances and o b l i g a t i o n s
a t t e n d a n t thereto forgiven, a l l considerations paid to s e l l e r s to
be retained by s e l l e r s as well as any improvements i n s t a l l e d upon
t h e p r o p e r t y to be r e t a i n e d by the s e l l e r s ; mutual and j o i n t
p r e p a r a t i o n and t r i a l of the right-of-way condemnation, and a
d i v i s i o n of a l l proceeds in excess of the $39,073 deposit to be
distributed among the buyers and s e l l e r s after attorney's fees and
c o s t s in the same_jpej^c_entages as t h e d e p o s i t t o t h e

extent

required to enable buyers to recover those sums paid pursuant to
the agreement as well as those sums expended in improvements, and
the s e l l e r s recover the contract balance, thereafter equally among

and between the buyers and s e l l e r s ; the remaining real property
was to be sold through the mutual e f f o r t s
sellers,

of t h e b u y e r s and

each d e v o t i n g in t h e i r own a r e a s of e x p e r t i s e the

diligence required to s e l l the real property. The proceeds of the
s a l e to be d i s t r i b u t e d between buyers and s e l l e r s to accomplish
the scheme and division hereinbefore immediately described.
A* A stipulation evidencing the parties agreement concerning
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the deposit was executed on the 11th day of
March 1983> by counsel for the respective p a r t i e s and the moneys
distributed.
identified

A t t a c h e d h e r e t o and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n and
as E x h i b i t A i s

a copy of a March 1 1 ,

1983

correspondence from Michael R. Labrum to a f f i a n t evidencing the
t r a n s m i t t a l of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n and also attached hereto and
incorporated herein and i d e n t i f i e d as Exhibit B i s a March 18,
1983 correspondence from affiant to Michael R. Labrum evidencing
receipt of the s t i p u l a t i o n and request t h a t a short memorandum
s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e agreement, which a f f i a n t has set forth in
paragraph 3 hereof be prepared and executed to e l i m i n a t e any
misunderstanding.
5* Affiant s t a t e s that the foregoing, in his opinion, was and
r e p r e s e n t s a t o t a l accord, s a t i s f a c t i o n and r e s o l u t i o n of the
i s s u e s e x i s t i n g between buyers and s e l l e r s , and further s t a t e s
upon h i s information, opinion and b e l i e f t h a t t h e m a t t e r was
t o t a l l y consumated and binding upon a l l p a r t i e s as a matter of
fact and law.

Dated this ^ 2 ^

day of January, 1985-

toi law ^

£eo

Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s cQ3^ ; day of January,
1985-

My Commission Expires: 1-29-87

Notary Public
Residing at: Bountiful, Utah

ICNAIL R L A B I U M
AWCUS TAYLOR

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
108 N O R T H M A I N

T E L E P H O N E 896-6484
AREA CODE 801

P.O. BOX 724
RICHFIELD. UTAH 84701

March 11, 1983

Mr. George Diumenti
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
RE:

Deseret vs. Elder et.al.

Dear George:
Please find enclosed a Stipulation for disbursal
of the funds presently on deposit with the Court in the
above-entitled action. I have heretofore sent out waivers
of interest to the other Defendants. I would appreciate
your signing the enclosed Stipulation and returning it at
your earliest convenience so that we might get the funds
disbursed.
The Court also granted us thirty (30) days from
March 14, 1983, to file briefs opposing Deseret's motion
to separate the condemnation action from the crossclaim and
counter crossclaims. The matter would then be submitted to
the Court upon the briefs without the need for oral argument,
Should you have any questions, please advise.
Very truly yours,

lael R. Labrum
MRL:dl

Enclosure

March 18, 1983

Mr. Michael R. Labrum
Attorney at Law
108 North Main
PoO. Box 724
Richfield, Utah 84701
RE:

Deseret v. Elder et al.

Dear M1ke:
I am 1n receipt of your correspondence and Stipulation
of March 11th. In that we have not memorialized 1n writing our
clients' agreement, I think that we should do so Immediately.
I'd appreciate your drafting a short memorandum setting forth
the agreement so that there will be no dispute as to the understanding at a later date.
Sincerely,
DIUMENTI, HARWARD & NELSON

George S. D1ument1 II
GSD/cg
enc.

Exhibit "B

MICHAEL R. LABRUM
LABRUM & TAYLOR
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS:
Bellons, A. Labrum & Sons,
& Dastxups
10 8 NORTH MAIN
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
896-6484
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF '^TAH
DESERET GENERATION and
TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STIPULATION

FERRON ELDER aka FERRON C.
ELDER, MARVEL MALNER, aka
MARVEL L. MALKER, FLYING
DIAMOND RANCHES, INC., a
Utah Corp., STEVE NELSON,
ARVIN L. BELLON, DRY GULCH
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah
Corp., THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, MOON LAKE WATER
USERS ASSOC, a Utah Corp.,
STATE OF UTAH acting through
the UTAH WATER AND POWER
BOARD, CLARK JENKINS, RICHARD
McCARVER, THOMAS C. MABEY,
J. McRAY JOHNSON, MAURINE G.
BELLON, A LABRUM AND SONS,
INC., a Utah Corp., B. CURTIS
DASTRUP and LANIS D. DASTRUP,
Defendants.

Civil No.

7732

COMES NOW MICHAEL R. LABRUM, attorney for Defendants,
Arvin 1U, Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, A. Labrum and Sons, Inc.,
a Utah corporation, B. Curtis Dastrup and Lanis D. Dastrup
and George Diumenti, Attorney for Defendants Ferron Elder,
Clark Jenkins, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay
Johnson and hereby stipulate and agree that the proceeds
heretofore deposited into Court by Plaintiff in order to obtain
their order of immediate occupancy in the amount of Thirty
Nine

Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars ($39,075.00) should be

distributed to these Defendants as follows:
1.

Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) plus any

accrued interest to Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon. A.
Labrum and Sons, Inc., a Utah Corporation, B. Curtis Dastrup
and Lanis D. Dastrup.
2.

Nine Thousand Seventy-Five Dollars ($9,075.00)

plus any accrued interest to Ferron Elder, Clark Jenkins, Richard
McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson.
DATED this 11th day of March, 19 83.

MICHAEL R. LABRUM
Attorney for Defendants Bellon,
Labrum and ^Dastrup

GEOAGE\DIUMENT\ V~
Atto\rney for Defendants xElder,
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and Johnson

Exhibit "C

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DESERET GENERATION and
TRANSMISSION, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

]

i

R U L I N G

vs.
FERRON ELDER, et al.,
Defendants.

i

Civil No. 7732

In this matter, Defendants Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and McRay,
purchasers of certain real property pursuant to a Real Estate Contract, have raised the issue of "frustration of purpose" as a defense against the Sellers, Defendants Bellon, Labrum and Dastrup.
Purchasers seek to terminate the contract and are seeking a refund
of monies paid, through that defense.

They contend that the con-

demnation action will destroy the value of the land.

Sellers con-

tend that the condemnation was foreseeable and does not constitute
a frustration of purpose entitling purchasers to restitution.
The issues before the Court are whether the defense of frustration of purpose is applicable to this case and if so whether
summary judgment is appropriate.
The doctrine of frustration of purpose has been developed by
the courts in an attempt to determine how the risk of loss of an
after-occurring condition should be distributed.

This doctrine

differs from impossibility of performance because the performance
of the contract, the purchase and sale of the land, is still
possible.

Rather, the doctrine is raised when one party claims that

its subjective purpose for entering into the agreement has been
frustrated by something occurring after the agreement•
The requisite elements of the doctrine include a fortuitous
event supervening to cause a failure of consideration or a destruction of the value of the expected purpose•

The doctrine re-

quires that the event be fortuitous? unforeseen, not caused by a
party and not preventable by them.

If the elements are present,

the courts have then applied the doctrine to determine which party
should bear the risk of loss.

See Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d

1282 (1976); Corbin on Contracts Section 1322, 1353, 1354, 1355;
17 Am Jur 2d Contracts, Sections 401 and 402,
In this case, the purchasers are claiming that the condemnation proceedings occurring nearly two years after sale constitute
the fortuitous event which destroys the possibility of this being
"developable property'1 • This raises several specific questions.
First, was thepossibility of condemnation reasonably foreseeable
at the time the contract was made?
expected purpose been destroyed?

Second, has the value of the
Third, what purpose was meant

by the term ''developable property"?

The answer to these questions

shows that the doctrine of frustration of purpose does not apply in
this case.
Condemnation proceedings can reasonably be foreseen when making
real estate contracts and particularly in areas currently in the
growth economy.

That the parties understood that this particular

property was in such an area is evidenced by the stated purpose.
Such condemnation could have been for roads, public utilities,
pipelines or for the powerlines as did occur.

That being the

case, the parties could have included provisions dealing with

that possibility in the contract.

Since the purchasers would be

the ones effected by such an event they had the duty to protect
themselves.

Their failure to do so causes the risk of loss to be

placed on. them rather than on the sellers.

That such an event was

foreseeable renders the occurrence non-fortuitous and the doctrine
does not apply.
In answering the second question it is equally evident that
the doctrine has no application.

By the very nature of condemnation

proceedings, the loss resulting from the condemnation will be repaid.
The duty of the court is to determine what damages, if any, are
caused by the taking, including severance damages to the property
not taken.

The intended result is to make the party suffering the

taking economically whole.
value be destroyed?

If such is accomplished, how can the

The parties are free to put on such evidence

as may be desired to establish the value of the property at its
highest and best use.
it was purchased.

Presumably, such use will be that for which

And if persuaded by the evidence, compensation

will be determined accordingly by the court.

Accordingly, in the

normal case and certainly in this case, the doctrine is inapplicable
because there is no destruction of value.
The third question raises factual issue which would be relevant
if the doctrine applied.

However, such questions are irrelevant at

this time.
The purchasers have also raised the defense of accord and
satisfaction.

This defense, however, seems to be based upon nego-

tiations Tor settlement which were never executed nor formally
agreed upon.
foundation.

Accord and satisfaction cannot be based upon such a

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by sellers is granted.
DATED this

/ ^ day of March, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

C. Keith Rooker
F. Elgin Ward
Ferron Elder
Michael R. Labrum
Richard McCarver
Thomas Mabey

Clark Jenkins
J. McRae Johnson
Robert Orton
John P. Ashton
Gordon A. Madsen
Steven Nelson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this f>^ day of October, 1985, I hereby certify
that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to the
following:
Michael R. Labrum, Esq.
LABRUM & TAYLOR
108 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Robert F. Horton, Esq.
68 South Main Street, 5th floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

